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QCSID:		Text Review:	
INAME:	MOODY, Juanita	Text w/Tape:	
IPLACE:	NSA, SAB2, Ft. Mean	le, MD; Conference Room	
<b>IVIEWER:</b>	HATCH, David A.; C	OLLINS, Jimmie A. EO 1.4. (c) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605	
[Tape 1, Sid			
Collins:	Moody in the SAB 2 confe after 33 years of federal s figure in A Group and also also a 2003 inductee into I'm Jimmie Collins along Cryptologic History. This will be TOP SECRET//CC recording. One topic toda problem during the 1950's	the 12th, 2003. We're speaking with Ms. Juanita erence room. Ms. Moody retired from NSA in 1976 ervice. She was an Agency legend: an illustrious o during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Ms. Moody was the Center for Cryptologic History Hall of Honor. with Dr. David Hatch from the Center for is Oral History 2003-12. The overall classification DMINT unless otherwise specified at end of the y is Ms. Moody's involvement in the Soviet s. She will also offer her side of the story about the ency during the 1970's. These allegations	
Hatch:	appeared in press as a result of the Church Committee hearings. [TR NOTE: Short pause in recording. Cuts in.] today and hope that you will give us your insights into the period of the Church-Pike hearings. For one thing, Milt Zaslow said that you are the only one who has the correct insight into the Agency's problems at that time. That we were not doing illegal things as was charged. We'd like to hear about that and we'd like to hear anything else that you'd be willing to tell us about with your experience in front of the Church-Pike Committee.		
Moody:		ne Director and some of his I think maybe the Ir. Buffham was the Deputy then, wasn't he?	
Hatch:	The Director was Lew Alle	en, is that correct?	
Moody:	be there for this occasion, as an Agency, were to sit responsibility for being the hearings. At all times I tes our mission one of collect Intelligence from foreign of purposes and I emphasize or American establishmen	that General Allen was God-sent to the Agency to He was good. When it got to the point where we, before the committee Lew Allen gave me the e overall Agency rep. who sat there through the stified before this committee that we considered ing communications or signals to produce Foreign communication. We said that we – for our ed this over and over – never targeted Americans ints. But that we considered it fair game to target emanated or terminated on foreign soil	
.4.(c)		Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52	
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The Yes, yes.

Hatch: Moody:

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So, you're talking about a communication that could

and so forth. I remember that Senator Mondale ordered me to... I mean he ordered me to bring in the very next day every item that we had ever published that mentioned an American citizen. I said, "Senator, the material largely - unless it's current material - is off-line because we're updating our equipment all the time and trying to get current material in on-line systems. But I will have to go back to records that are off-line and being processed on old equipment that we are phasing out. We have lot of trouble with it. So, to the best of my ability I will do this." He said to me, "I don't give a good god damn about you and your computers, Mrs. Moody. Do you understand what I said? You just bring the material in here tomorrow. I want it tomorrow morning when you come in." I excused myself and called General Allen and told him. He called in everybody. They tried to keep this old equipment clunking away that night. Well, it really didn't matter by the next morning whether we'd ever fulfilled "every one" because we had wheel barrows full of material. There's no way you can keep a foreigner talking to another foreigner or a message from mentioning an American or even maybe quoting them. There was intelligence to be had from what somebody thinks someone said or something.

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#### Hatch: That's right.

Moody:

But anyway, that was not and is not targeting Americans. I deliberately buried Senator Mondale in tons of this. He was almost begging for help. Then he came over to me the next day after I had dumped all this stuff. He got tired of it pretty fast. He realized it. Put his arm on my shoulder. I wasn't too pleased or happy about that at this point. Said, "Oh." I don't know that he said I'm sorry. But he said, "I didn't realize that you people were so cooperative." I hate to say it but the next thing he said, which I also resented, "I thought you were like the CIA." As a member of the Intelligence Community I resented that. But that is true. That has always been the truth.

Hatch:

Moody: That w

Yes.

Yes. [TR NOTE: Short pause in interview and then resumes.] That was the case. However, as I understand even communications coming and going in and out of the United States became no-no's in the follow-up legislation. But as far as the Committee goes, we came out there... In fact,

when I got that award that's what that was about. In 1976.

Hatch: When DCI Bush gave it to you.

**Moody:** Yes. And Lew Allen... The way I always understand it Lew Allen was the one who wanted me to have the award specifically because of what we were able to accomplish with the Church Committee.

Hatch: Moody:

I'm going to see him for dinner Saturday night incidentally.

Hatch: Please pass him my regards.

Moody: Are we back on now?

Collins: We're back on.

Hatch: Over the years, he looks better and better all time as a Director.

Moody: Well, he was....In that area... Anyway, I...

Hatch: Just out of curiosity, how did you transport all this material down to Senator Mondale?

Moody: We took a damn truck. Excuse me.

Hatch: No, that's all right. We're all adults here.

Moody: We took it in a truck. We had to pile it. It was horrendous. I just made as big of a... And the other Senators, they didn't like the way he had treated me. He was very rude to me. They way they all looked at him. He never asked another question the whole time I was down there. He treated me... Everybody else, including Church, were always very polite and very gentlemanly to me.

Hatch: Yes. Did you ever appear in open session or was it always in closed sessions?

**Moody:** Always closed sessions. In the beginning, the first day he told me I would be expected to appear in open sessions and in fact on television to be broadcast throughout the country.

Hatch: This was Church?

Moody:

Church told me this. I told him that I wasn't going to do that. I was not going to testify. He asked me why. I said, "Because I don't know anything that would want to say about my work and the work of the National Security Agency that would be appropriate in open session. I took an oath to protect classified information and never to reveal it to those who are not authorized and have the need to know. I don't know of any law that would be require me to take an oath to break an oath. Is there such a thing, Senator?" Senator Goldwater spoke up and said, "I don't know it either. What Mrs. Moody is saying... That's a very good question and should be answered before we go any further. I in fact am going to call the Library of Congress to take guestion under consideration." An awful lot of people were out of town when they started calling around. I'm not going to name them. They actually... Senator Goldwater and Senator Tower called me aside to give me some advise. They said to me, "We have been on the Appropriations Committee and we've been cleared to know a lot about NSA and your activities and what you're doing. We know how precious this is to national security. But most of these Senators, if they knew what we know, would certainly not want to go on open session televised hearings. Your problem is one of educating them. Mrs. Moody, I want you to take every opportunity to educate them and see if we can't turn this around." He told me to ... I think I have before given you and I could give you examples of how that was

done. But it was brilliantly done by Senators Goldwater and Howard Baker. as a matter of fact. At one point, Senator Baker called on me to ... He asked the Chairman if he could call on me to give a description of the entire SIGINT process from beginning to end in, as nearly as I could put it, layman's terms for the education and understanding of this body of people in the room. The Senators. I did so. As a matter of fact, I considered it a great privilege and I really enjoyed it. It was the only thing I enjoyed down there. They gave me all the time I needed. I did it. When I finished, Senator Baker said, "Now I'm going to take what I understand Mrs. Moody said and put it in my version of layman's terms. Correct me if I get off the track Mrs. Moody." It was tremendous that he could take... Because we lived in a pretty technical world. Although I had contacts on the outside, we still talked our own lingo. For this Senator to be able to ... I was really impressed with him. That was very helpful. Anyway, there were several opportunities that I had. I remember on one occasion I had the opportunity to slip a note to Goldwater through (B% Mac Mathias), who for some reason thought I was his client. So, he would bring me coffee. Nice man. I guess he would have brought me coffee anyway. But there were three Senators there that thought I was their client. It was really interesting. [TR NOTE: All laugh.] Until they all figured out that I was nobody's client. I slipped a note to... I gave it to him when he brought coffee. He delivered it to Goldwater. Goldwater asked a question of the witness. The witness happened to be Frank Raven. He was great at that. But that was the one time he was there when I was there. There was never a time - a la Bamford's book "The Puzzle Palace" - when Roy Banner and Frank Raven and I were there at the same time. I know exactly which time each one of them... That Roy Banner was never there but one day. I could go into that. I am positive of that. General Allen could back me up on that. So, that was fabricated information right there. Anyway, I'm a little off the track. It's not really relevant to what we're talking about.

Hatch:

Also, just to establish things here. Can you tell me about how many sessions you appeared in? Was it a weeks worth? Two weeks worth?

**Moody:** I think it was better than a week. Pike didn't get very far, you know. He blabbed off real early. They stopped him.

Hatch: Did you appear before the Pike Committee as well?

**Moody:** I appéared one time. I met Pike when he asked for some information and nobody else in the Agency would do it. The Director sent me to talk to him.

Hatch: This was not in the session. This was...

**Moody:** No. The session was a specific item in which I was told to hand-carry down there. In the middle of it all, Pike leaked information or was responsible for information that was that got leaked. He got sidetracked.

Hatch: Right, right.

Moody:

In the end, we did not go into open hearings. Buff [Buffham] told me the other day that there was an open hearing. But I never knew it and never saw

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the... Before we got into the details of the inquiry. This was when he and the Director were talking to the Committee about the possibility of open hearings.

General Allen was well noted as the first NSA Director to appear in open Hatch: session before a committee.

Right. That was before. But the subsequent hearings and the questions and Moody: all that... None of them. Although, it was scheduled to happen. But I said I wouldn't do it.

Hatch: I need to ask you a hard question.

Okav. Moodv:

DOCID:

Hatch: Project MINARET was a watch list of names that the Agency was looking for in traffic of various kinds. Were there American names in MINARET as was charged?

Yes, yes. But not ever did we... We never targeted Americans. This would Moody: have been information. There again, I think today we must have a requirement for what is being said about George Bush in foreign communications. If we don't, we're crazy.

Hatch: Well, there are exceptions for people of a certain rank. Also, other people can give permission. By having ...

Moody: But we're also talking about today and not then. We really had never gotten in to that. But that is exactly what I was talking about when I told you that I raised that question to Pat Carter and got told to go back to where you belong little girl. Do your thing and I'll do mine.

Hatch: Yes

Moody:

Never though... When I raised a question I had people looking for that information. But I guess it was in the files he gave to Bamford. He turned his files over to Bamford. He did not know what he was talking about. In order to protect classified information, sensitive information, one has to understand it. I always maintained you can't protect something you don't understand. That one case where loads of files were turned over... The man that turned the files over didn't know what he was doing. I don't care what anybody says, I'll always maintain that was the case.

Hatch:

Did you ever seek a legal opinion about this?

Moody: I didn't. But you know, I asked the Director to.

Hatch: Okay. The legal office was not as large then anyway.

Moody: Well, I don't know what they would have done. I can't tell you whether I did or not. I'll tell you, I had a hand in a lot of things that went on in the Agency. But I did not have the total overall responsibility over NSA at any one time. There were things....

Hatch:

Yes. Let me ask you another hard question. You may or may not want to stay on the record on this. Can you talk about the so called

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		Were you? Had some things on that.
	Moody:	Yes, yes.
	Hatch:	I should tell you before hand that
	Moody:	Yes. But I wish you would tell me how it got past me and Lew Allen.
$\backslash$	Hatch:	
•	Moody:	I was supposed to know. I was his outlet. He looked to me and understo it. I thought I knew everything that went: Somebody went around us. I ca tell you who it was. It was either one or two things. Because I knew this to pretty well. I had people in every Agency downtown who also kept me
		informed.
	•	
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•		
	/.	
• •		
	/**	
, 		I was almost never at home. One day, mont
		later, I walked in the house. My husband was bringing our luggage in an the phone rang. I picked it up. Somebody asked if this was Juanita Mood
2.1	- -	said, "Yes." They said, "My god, I didn't know you were real. We've beer
$x + \sqrt{-1}$		looking for you for "
/ · .	•	
	•	

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and the second se					
and the second sec	have a decent conversation with them.				
	– or				
	That's what I think happened.				
	Does that make any sense to you?				
Hatch:	Yeah, it does. It does.				
Moody:	Of course later, the way he ran his mouth off to Bamford and the crazy things he said and did. The man was crazy. I remember going – after I had retired – over to England. Everybody over there was furious. They told me then that our then Director was going to take legal action against all this. But as you know, he had a stroke. So, that took care of that.				
Hatch:	Well, there was (1-2G)				
Moody:	It's a sad, sad thing. But I think I know the day he did it. Does (B% Don Renquich) mean anything to you?				
Hatch:	Yes, I know the name.				
Moody:	Because I got a call one day from somebody in the Pentagon who told me				
	that				
	Defense. Admiral Murphy used to sit right outside the Secretary's office. When I got the award from George Bush he was one of the people that came to my ceremony. He came around to me. He said, "Did you know there was a time when I really I understand now." I forget. He had been reassigned. He knew what was But, "There was a time when I really resented you because you would send those brown envelopes "What I did. I didn't go. I would send them hand-carry by our Rep. in the NMCC. I gave it to him to be opened only by I know that's what happened. But like I say, I probably ought not to be recording this. But anyway, that's				
Hatch:	Is there anything more you would like to say about the Church-Pike or about the things that we were accused of in that period before we move on to the other subject that we'd like to discuss?				
Moody:	Well, even the day that I got that award I felt sorry for a lot of my cohorts in the FBI and CIA. In fact, they came around to me and talked to me about it. They said, "You know NSA came out of this very well and we got very badly" I went away think we had. Just by the fact that we stayed off television. They never did. Then Church hadn't given up. As you know, this was right at the end of the Ford administration. Carter came in and then they I can tell you that my husband was ill. My parents were getting ill. I had done nothing but work. NSA was my life. But that's what made me decide I'm going to go do something for somebody else. I gave Allen my reason for leaving. He begged me not to go. I owed something to my family and I had the opportunity to do that. I remember saying to him, "I think I've				
н 1911 г. н. 1	had the opportunity to have whatever influence I could on this whole process. If I did, I did. If I didn't, I didn't. But I think it's time for me to move on." But anyway, we did not target. That's the question. We did not go after				

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American communications. We did not target them. We targeted foreign communications. You can argue all day if you want to about whether... I would say even if I were quoted by two foreigners in a communication and the quote was a lie, that's still doesn't mean that I didn't target it.

Hatch:

That's right. Well, there's a lot of emphasis... In fact, our history center is now involved in a project about awareness of responsibilities of rights and targeting and reporting and so on. We will use this material to help. To be sure that there's a correct interpretation of...

Moody:

I think if we ever really wanted to take certain things that have been said, we need to take a statement and then do a rebuttal. We've got to be ... I would be willing to do whatever I can to help you with that. But I don't think you want to just do something willy-nilly, off the cuff. I think the statement that Bamford made and the way he said it, he should have been stopped right there. Somebody should say, "Look here. Shut your mouth. You're wrong." I wish I had the opportunity to do it. But only with back-up. I had the opportunity on his first book to read it in draft form. As I understand it, nobody got to read it before it went to press. I turned him down. He called me four times. I refused to talk to him. He got mad the last time he called me. He said, "I'm trying to give you an opportunity to read the draft of my book and set the record straight." I said, "You're implying that you know the record isn't straight. I have nothing to say to you on the subject. Will not." Then, at the last minute, I finally decided there's got to be somebody at NSA I can talk to. I told Dick Lord. He said, "Well, my god, the Agency should tell you yeah. Go read what he has to say. Hear him out." With the Agency behind me. I had already mentioned it to all the right people. None of them had done anything. So, Dick then went to the Director and said, "Here we are. We have the chance." I said to Dick, "What we ought to do... I don't even want to come back in here. I'm trying to live a different life. But I'll do it. Somebody ought to see what he has to say. If we don't like it, put a banana peeling where it belongs." I still believe in that. That's what I think we in the intelligence... That's what we've been talking about with the CIA in the last few... Since 9-11.

The Agency has been active in that regard in terms of some of the television. programs that have been produced. So, perhaps we learned from our lost opportunity with the earlier material.

I always thought that was an opportunity that was there. I know I would have fought. Man, I would have fought tooth and nail. But not if I didn't get backed up.

Right. Can we switch gears and talk about the Soviet problems? Yes.

Moody:

Let's see. Where was I?

Time is moving on and we would like to get this on the record as well. When did you begin to work this?

Moody:

Hatch:

Moody:

Hatch:

Hatch:

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Hatch:

It doesn't have to be an exact date. Just a general time frame.

Moody:

I think... I'm trying to think. When I had responsibility for the entire East European problem. It was a branch. Ann Caracristi had a branch on the Soviet problem. They decided in the interest of moving... Anne and I had been fingered by Canine as people that....Canine had told me some time back that "You're going to do what I say and one of these days you're going to go someplace." Whether you wanted to or not you were going to do what Canine said. This was part of this. We got sent off to all kinds of executive development schools and classes and stuff. Of course, I loved it. I loved a new challenge any time. My memory's not what it used to be. I used to know... I didn't forget anything. I believe that must have been about '53 or 54 and they switched us. She took the East European problem and I went to the Soviet - what they called manual - problem. With that I picked up the responsibility for the Soviet HF problem. Then in 1956... That would probably have been '54, I think, to '56. It was like a year and a half in all. I remember it was the time when the Carson Committee was studying how to reorganize the Agency. I had a lot of opportunities. Spent a lot of time with them projecting what I would like to see. How I would like to see things done. But even then, I was advocating one person with responsibility for the Soviet problem instead of having what ended up GENS and ADVA. But anyway, that didn't come. I was very disappointed. I ended up in ADVA, which Canine... The most erudite office in the world and office of advance studies and so forth. Well, Arthur Levenson was made the Chief. I was one of the Chiefs. I had the responsibility for... We organized things strangely. We hadn't yet learned that we ought to at least take targets into consideration. Instead we organized into methods.

#### Hatch:

Oh, yes.

Moody:

So, they had the machine problem and the manual that I was at. That went of for five years. So, I had a total of probably close to six years. I stayed with ADVA. We vowed – with Arthur Levenson, George (B% McGean), and I – that we would stay there no matter what. Certain people would come around every six months offering me jobs. Again, I man whose name I shall not call... But just trying to break up what was going on. Because our undertaking was such that we needed time. We had to. It was during that time that I got involved in the Free Hand paper. The question of if given a free hand what would you do. The Hoover Committee implementation and so forth. Thus ADVA and GENS. So, during that time and then up from there until '61. July the first, 1961, I walked out of that one and went to what was to become known loosely as G Group. But it was B something the way that we were organized. B1, I think. That's when I left that problem. But I found.... The problem was that the

the Russians. It was not always

I had a high

priority on that problem. The problem was small enough that you could do things with it. I used that because I could get a little money as well as it

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being a wonderful way – that's where Cecil Phillips and I worked – at building a capability that would be applicable throughout the entire SIGINT world. Thus influencing how we intercepted and what we took in. How we formatted the material and took all subsequent processes into consideration. Up through, to, and including the end. As you know, I also worked for years on laying that product in to the baskets of our users in computerized form so they could take it from that.

Hatch:

Right, right

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Moody:

We had a lot of I found immediately that the problem that had been my responsibility... Right after the war... I was promised a sabbatical then in the R & D. That's what they promised me if I would stay with the Agency when I started to go back to college. But they interrupted me to take the Yugoslav problem. I remembered then reading through the TICOM documents, which I used to do after hours as they were being translated in a file by Dr. (B% Petangill). Who, incidentally, pinched every woman that came near him. I kicked him a few times and taught him better. But I would go in there at night and read. I remembered running across something that fascinated me as a young analyst. The reason I was doing it. I was reading what all these Germans said after the war in the TICOM material about what they had done and what they knew about cryptanalysis to build up my own information.

I was fascinated with that. So, when I got the responsibility... They came one day down in R & D and made me go and take this problem.

Hatch: Moody:

I never could get back to it.

Ah. Wow.

Same thing happened then.

Specifically... Now, this documented this. In fact, Lou

has never been recorded. We have never documented this. In fact, Lou Tordella told me, "Let's just..." But what I'm saying to you now is... We exploited it. We read a lot of stuff.

somewhere who has...

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No. Contraction of the second	What I'm coving to you _ I'm					
	What I'm saying to you I'm not saying this is applicable here but I'm saying					
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$H \to I$						
1 / 1						
	and in a problem where we've never documented what happened is similar.					
$( \land \land \land \land )$	Now, back to the Yugoslav thing. That was quite different. What they did.					
WW = V	They had a key pad – with anywhere					
	from 360 to 400 It was either 360 or 450. There were two different sizes of					
	five digit groups. They'd go through this. Put their tapes through a monome/dinome. Then they would apply this additive. These were one time					
	pads. Then they turned the pad. Went all the way through it this way and					
	then turned it this way. You'd have one digit and that many times. [TR					
	NOTE: XG due to interviewer speaking.] Do you know I had I trained a					
	group of people. I had five or six people. I had one old gal in particular					
	named (B% Edith Squaza) who could sit there and work					
$\cdot $	That's another real good thing. But that's not applicable here.					
	What I'm talking about here is that I know that these   I'm so sick of hearing the press talking					
	about us intercepting people's cell phone information and so forth. I also					
	know that we're talking about					
. \\\						
Hatch:	Right.					
Moody:	If I weren't so old I'd just love to get into that again and see. Because I know					
	that it's going to be different from any other type of situation because we've					
	Of course					
	But we're talking about					
Collins:	Excuse me for one moment while I flip the tape.					
[End of Tap	e 1, Side 1]					
[Tape 1, Sid	e 2]					
Hatch:	[TR NOTE: Audio cuts in.]					
	Were you able [TR NOTE: Audio cuts out for several					
	minutes.]					
Moody:	[TR NOTE: Audio cuts in.] to get a kind of start. because if you want to I					
	don't like to do anything but I don't like to do a shabby job. If you want to					
	try to pursue any of this or if there's any reason to or anything.					
Hatch:	Well, what more do you have to say about the problem? Do you?					
Hatch: Moody:						
	Well, what more do you have to say about theproblem? Do you?					

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	today that all the years that I knew Cal, he used to a "Juanita, you've had so many experiences that you should document them." I would say, "Cal, they won moved.	need to write up. You	
Hatch:	Well, you know we have two other interviews with yo	ou, which covered other	
	parts of your career. Were you		
Moody:	Yes	1	
Hatch:	Were you able to	What did you do	
naton.	with them?		
Moody:	Let me tell you what I did. I went to		
	Now, let me tell you the other thing I did.		
	" I'll tell you another th	ning I did.	
	One time, I'll tell you Oh, let me get b Is this	ack to this. So,	
Collins:	Yes.	et et et	
Moody:	God! Again, Louis will turn over in his grave. Tordella.		
Collins:	Yeah, that's right.		
Moody:	So, they were We all <u>know this is true. I don't like t</u> I'm just telling the way.	to I'm not criticizing.	
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Yes. Okay. All right. [TR NOTE: Audio abruptly ends here.] Hatch: [End of interview]

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